On Aug. 19 Rezaei, a member of Iran’s parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told media the management, supervision and inspection of the Strait of Hormuz are Iran’s sole responsibility and are overseen by the Armed Forces General Staff. He said if Iran’s interests are harmed anywhere in the world, Tehran could retaliate in the Strait of Hormuz against hostile states or governments by raising tariffs or seizing assets.

以色列国防军：以军袭击了位于加沙地带北部沙提地区的哈马斯指挥官，他们正策划针对以军部队的恐怖袭击计划。

Ross Harrison, senior fellow at the U.S. Middle East Institute, says Iran’s post-war foreign policy is unlikely to revert to total isolation or to rapidly follow a Vietnam-style full integration. Economic realities make decades-long, gradual change more likely than a near-term transformation. The more probable outcome is a dual-track strategy: engaging diplomatically with Gulf Arab states while keeping military coercion — missile threats and the option to close the Strait of Hormuz — as leverage. The 2025–26 wars have weakened Iran and unsettled neighbors, prompting some Gulf capitals to privately reassess long-term reliance on U.S. security and consider hedging with Tehran. Washington’s instinct to tighten containment by arming Israel and Gulf partners could validate Tehran’s worst-case expectations and risk provoking further attacks on Gulf states. Harrison argues policymakers should leave space for Iranian regional diplomacy and evaluate whether such moves produce more constructive behavior rather than judging them solely on whether they solve all underlying issues.