Rashid Al-Mohanadi, vice president of the Centre for International Policy Studies, stated that Iran's attacks exposed the limitations of external security guarantees and prompted the Gulf region to begin establishing its own security architecture. Peace in the Gulf region is often short-lived. After Iran's first attack on Gulf territory in February, the ceasefire agreement lasted only a few weeks; the memorandum of understanding reached in the summer also expired within a month. Each suspension ended in a similar manner: key facilities were attacked by drones, shipping chokepoints were blocked, and bombing resumed.
This war demonstrates that what the Gulf region needs is not another "security umbrella," but an independent security ecosystem. In February, the air defense and missile defense systems built by Gulf states over many years successfully intercepted most of the targets launched by Iran, but Iran still caused serious damage to civilian facilities and exposed the region's maritime vulnerabilities. Many analysts interpreted the Gulf governments' refusal to escalate as passive, while Tehran interpreted it as weakness. However, the Gulf states' choice of restraint is not weakness, but a strategy based on effective defense. This restraint has allowed the Gulf states to maintain communication channels among all parties, even with Iran.
The fundamental problem is that decades of reliance on external security guarantees have not protected the Gulf from war. Now, the Gulf states are beginning to build a security ecosystem comprising four layers: the enabling capabilities of the US and Europe, the core strength of the Gulf Cooperation Council, broader regional partnerships (such as the R4 mechanism comprised of Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan), and their domestic industrial base. Recent concrete actions demonstrate this: on July 28, Saudi Arabia and the US jointly launched airstrikes against militia targets in Iraq; two days later, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a 14-nation maritime defense coalition responsible for navigation security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. These moves signify that the Gulf states are shifting from "security at the expense of others" to "security at the expense of others," attempting to break free from the 50-year-long dependence on others to set their security conditions.
