Ross Harrison, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, argues that Iran's post-war foreign policy is unlikely to lead to either the worst or the best possible outcome. Given the need for ideology to give way to economic realities, Iran is unlikely to revert to a purely "fortress-like" isolation—holding Gulf states hostage and abandoning diplomacy altogether. At the same time, Iran is also unlikely to follow a Vietnam-like path of transformation by abandoning resistance and shifting towards regional integration. Such a transformation, if it ultimately occurs, will be a decades-long project, not something that can be completed in months or even years.
The more likely path is also more difficult for Washington to navigate: Iran will engage in diplomacy with its Gulf Arab neighbors while maintaining a constant "finger on the trigger"; offering trade and stability on one hand, while holding the missile threat and the leverage to close the Strait of Hormuz on the other. In other words, from Iran's perspective, the most likely strategy to actively deter enemies while addressing the economic difficulties and resulting social discontent after a ceasefire is to combine deterrence with diplomacy.
This strategy may work. The wars of 2025 and 2026 will not only severely damage the Islamic Republic but also unsettle its neighbors. The Gulf Arab states witnessed Iranian missile launches and, more importantly, saw Washington's security commitments seem less steadfast than previously claimed. This "double exposure" has led some Gulf capitals to privately consider whether their long-term security should be built on permanent dependence on the United States, or on reaching some kind of arrangement with Tehran as a strategic hedge against risk.
Based on these lessons, Washington's task is not to convince Tehran that the US goal is not regime change, but to influence how Iran uses the confidence and anger gained from the war. The instinct to further strengthen containment and provide weapons to Israel and the Gulf Arab states to encircle Iran is understandable. However, this approach could also backfire, as in the past, further confirming Tehran's most pessimistic assessments and potentially provoking more Iranian attacks on the Gulf states, threatening their security. A better option is to allow space for regional diplomacy that Iran itself might be willing to explore, judging their success not by whether these arrangements can solve all problems, but by whether they can encourage more constructive behavior from Iran.
